16. February 2012

The report on the operations of the pension funds.

The report now presented on the operations of the Icelandic pension funds is extensive and highlights much that could be, and could have been, done better in the funds' operations. It contains an overview and review of the funds' operations in the years 2006–2010 and the impact of the 2008 economic collapse on the funds' assets. It is clear that Gildi, like other pension funds and other investors, suffered heavy losses in the collapse of the financial system. This has been clearly reflected in Gildi's annual accounts in recent years, as well as in presentations at the Fund's Annual General Meetings and fund member meetings.

The Review Committee's report contains a wide range of information that clarifies the picture of the pension funds' investment strategy, investments and operating environment in the run-up to the banking collapse. It also contains many useful observations and comments which the Fund will certainly examine carefully and put to use in its ongoing efforts to improve its practices in asset and risk management. Although substantial changes have already taken place in this regard, and many of the comments made in the Review Committee's report have already been addressed, further development and improvement in this area within the Fund is now under way.

When examining the pension funds' losses, it is necessary to bear in mind the environment and regulatory framework the funds operated under. They were required to invest a certain proportion of their assets domestically. A small market and relatively limited investment options meant that the Fund's exposure to shocks in the Icelandic economy was, and remains, considerable.

Gildi also considers it important, when assessing the Fund's losses, that the overall outcome for the Fund be considered and the loss set in the context of what happened in the years before the banking collapse. A large proportion of the securities that were lost in the collapse had previously risen sharply in value, and fund members' benefits had been increased on the basis of those increases. The Review Committee calculates the pension funds' losses based on the valuation in effect at the turn of 2007/2008. That valuation was even higher in mid-2007 but then declined steadily until the banks collapsed in October 2008. This method of calculation used by the committee is not incorrect. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that the funds' real loss is based on the purchase price of the securities, which first multiplied in value during the upswing but then became worthless in the banking collapse and the bankruptcies that followed.

For this reason, the exact figures for the pension funds' real loss from the collapse can be debated. No one denies, however, that the loss is considerable, though it should be borne in mind that it is in many ways comparable to what pension and investment funds in our neighbouring countries and elsewhere in the world have had to endure. The assets of foreign pension funds fell sharply in 2008 due to the steep decline in foreign equity markets, with the world equity index falling by 42% during the year. Unlike what happened abroad, the decline in the Icelandic market was largely permanent, as most of the companies went bankrupt. The fact that the OMX Iceland Main Index (ICEX) fell by 94% in 2008 speaks clearly to this.

The Review Committee's report can be found on the website of the National Association of Pension Funds.

Back to news