17. October 2013
A few issues to be resolved.
Article by Hrafn Magnússon, former CEO of the National Association of Pension Funds. The article appeared in the 8th issue of the online publication Kjarninn.
The losses of Icelandic pension funds following the economic crash five years ago were smaller than the average losses of pension funds in OECD countries. Some Icelandic pension funds in the general labour market had to respond by reducing pension entitlements, which is of course always difficult. However, those same funds had paid a special pension bonus during the boom years, which now inevitably had to be reversed. Pension funds backed by the state and municipalities naturally did not need to reduce pension entitlements. Pension funds in the general labour market have, however, paid indexed pensions since the crash. The increase amounts to almost 30% based on the consumer price index, in line with the increase in wages over the same period.
The Icelandic pension system is therefore robust and sound, despite the crash in the autumn of 2008. Pension funds' net assets held to pay pensions reached, as early as 2009, a level higher than the peak before the crash, and by the end of last August had reached ISK 2,542 billion.
Icelandic pension funds' net assets amounted to around 140% of GDP in 2012. Only in the Netherlands was the ratio higher within the OECD. In the countries of southern Europe, the situation is dire when it comes to pension fund systems. Pension fund assets in Italy amount to only around 5% of GDP, and the assets of the Greek funds are not even measurable in this comparison.
The state of pension affairs in this country is in good shape when compared with the pressing problems in the pension systems of other European countries. Those nations are older, meaning the proportion of older people relative to the working population is higher than in Iceland. People leave the labour market earlier, sometimes before the age of 60, and often then receive generous social security benefits, which are straining the finances of many states. Most of the mass protests in Europe stem from government plans to raise the retirement age, for example to 67. The birth rate is also lower in Europe than in Iceland, meaning that a so-called retirement crisis looms abroad if nothing is done in the coming years. Everything therefore seems to be conspiring to make pension matters harder to manage in most European countries than here in Iceland.
There are, admittedly, various warning signs here in Iceland regarding the future of the pension fund system if no action is taken. It is therefore right to remain vigilant and aim for a satisfactory resolution of several issues concerning the pension funds and the structure of the pension system.
The first issue
Firstly, it is necessary to prevent pension payments from the funds from reducing social security benefits to the extent currently practised. The tax-free threshold is too low, which hits low-income retirement pensioners hardest. This interplay between the pension of the Social Insurance Administration and the pension funds needs to be fixed once and for all, because the current situation undermines people's willingness to pay into pension funds. Admittedly, pension fund payments no longer affect the basic social security pension, which is to be welcomed, but the authorities have historically gone far too far in reducing social security benefits.
The second issue
Secondly, the pension entitlements of public sector employees and employees in the general labour market need to be harmonised as far as possible. The deficit at the State Employees' Pension Fund (LSR) at the last year-end totalled around ISK 450 billion, i.e. the fund's total liabilities in excess of its assets. Looking only at the accrued position, the deficit totalled ISK 370 billion. This is an extremely serious situation that worsens with every passing year if appropriate measures are not taken. The deficit at LSR and the municipal pension funds is a concern for the whole nation, because this situation shifts the tax burden onto future generations.
The third issue
Thirdly, the capital controls on the pension funds' foreign investments need to be lifted. The funds' investment environment is characterised by capital controls and few investment options. Such lack of diversity is dangerous in the long run. At their peak, the funds' foreign assets amounted to around 33% of total assets, but this ratio has now fallen to 22% of assets. It is essential for the pension funds to spread risk by investing abroad. The Icelandic financial market is too small for the pension funds, and indeed the funds' presence has become uncomfortably large in certain segments of the market. There is also a risk that the pension funds will invest too heavily in government bonds, which would gradually change the nature of the pension system and shift it towards a pay-as-you-go system, in which future generations would have to bear the burden of repaying the state's debts. Another concern, given how homogeneous the market is and how few investment options there are, is that pension funds may turn to riskier domestic investments. When the capital controls are eventually eased, this will presumably be done in stages with respect to investors. The pension funds need to be at the front of that queue if things are not to go badly.
The fourth issue
Fourthly, consideration should be given to the possibility of lowering the pension funds' actuarial interest rate assumption, currently 3.5% above the consumer price index. This would result in a reduction in pension entitlements in the general labour market, though least for retirees already drawing a pension. The interest rate assumption means that the funds need, on average, to achieve a 3.5% real return over the longer term. It is, however, a misunderstanding to say that 3.5% is a return requirement that the funds demand and are unwilling to lend below under any circumstances. That is incorrect, and indeed absurd. Naturally, the pension funds must accept whatever real interest rates are available at any given time, even when these are lower than the return assumption. It may be noted, for example, that at many pension funds, fund member loans now carry lower real interest rates than the stated return assumption.
Looking at the last twenty years, the pension funds' real return has been positive in sixteen years and negative in only four. Of those sixteen years, the pension funds' real return has exceeded 3.5% a total of twelve times, and last year, for example, the funds' net real return, according to the Financial Supervisory Authority, was 7.3%. There is therefore no need for us to rush into a decision to lower the return assumption. If the return assumption is to be lowered, it would be wisest to do so in stages.
The fifth issue
Fifthly, it is necessary to face the fact that life expectancy among Icelanders has increased significantly in recent years, and this trend will continue, although there must presumably be some limit to how much longer average life expectancy can rise over the longer term. Since 1990, the average remaining lifespan of 65-year-old men has lengthened by 2.4 years (14%) and of women by 1.8 years (9%). This is a welcome development, but it creates a certain challenge for the pension funds, which pay retirement pensions for life. Because of increased life expectancy, pension liabilities have grown by 10%. In actuarial calculations, this additional pension liability has been incorporated in stages using new mortality and survival tables. New tables that took effect at the last year-end increased pension liabilities by 1% to 1.5%. This is, in fact, a positive problem to have, though it does have a negative effect on the pension funds' actuarial position.
The sixth issue
Sixthly and finally, when assessing the pension funds' asset and risk management, full account must be taken of political risk, regardless of which parties are in government at any given time. Risk management at the funds needs to account for the negative effects that uncertainty over possible government action may create. This includes changes to laws and/or regulations governing pension funds, or their interpretation, which may cause significant changes to their operations. Ideas about changes to tax law may also be mentioned here, whether relating to a special wealth tax or a capital gains tax on the funds. This category of risk also includes losses that may arise from pressure from the government or other parties that could have a negative impact on the funds' operations. Examples here include proposals for the funds to invest in unprofitable public projects, as well as for the funds to write off recoverable claims.